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Hotel managers’ actions after 9–11 included modifying marketing activities, reducing employees’
hours, and either postponing capital improvements (for lack of cash flow) or accelerating planned
upgrades while business is slow.
© 2002, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
Voices from the Field
GMs’ Responses to
the Events of
September 11, 2001
BY MASAKO S. TAYLOR AND CATHY A. ENZ
Tourism Council noted a 30-percent drop in global travel-
industry revenues immediately after September 11, and then
predicted a decline of 10 to 20 percent in the United States
over the ensuing 12 months.1 Furthermore, the Travel Busi-
ness Roundtable Index of leading economic indicators fell
8.4 percent for the month of September 2001—the largest
single monthly decline on record.2
In the hotel industry, Smith Travel Research recorded a de-
cline in occupancies in almost all major cities in the world, and
noted that room rates were being lowered in most markets.3
This study attempts to summarize the collective voicesof hotel operators in the weeks after the September11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. Its
purpose is to gain an understanding of how hotel operators
responded to those challenging times and to document gen-
eral managers’ plans for the future. For instance, what effect
did the events of September 11 have on day-to-day opera-
tions? What are general managers doing today to maintain
operational success? What lessons can be learned by and shared
with the industry at large?
Hard-hit after September 11
The economic ripple effects of the September 11 attacks have
been widely reported. Globally, that effect was felt primarily
in the travel and tourism industry. The World Travel and
1 “A Business in Search of Customers,” The Economist, September 29, 2001,
pp. 61–62.
2 “The Travel and Tourism Industry Hammered Hard in Wake of Septem-
ber 11 Attack,” a press release from Travel Business Roundtable, Novem-
ber 13, 2001.
3 See: “Smith Travel Research Global Lodging Statistics, 2001” (an annual
report).
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Today, more than six months later, major U.S.
hotel chains are still struggling to regain the
business levels that they had before the attacks.
For instance, U.S. industry occupancy for the
third quarter of 2001 was just 64.2 percent—a
decrease of 8 percent when compared to the same
period in 2000. Similarly, by the end of
September 2001, average room rates (ADR) had
dropped 3.4 percent, to US$83.28, and revenue
per available room (RevPAR) had decreased 11.2
percent, to US$53.44.4 Compared to September
2000, the month of September 2001 saw an
occupancy drop of 15.9 percent, down to 55.9
percent, and room rate declined 8.9 percent to
$79.30.
While those broad-based performance
indicators clearly show a decline in demand and
subsequent revenue, the effect of the September
11 attacks at the property level is unclear. In this
study we focus on day-to-day operations and
explore managers’ responses at the property level.
The Voices from the Field
To provide a picture of what is happening at the
property level in the wake of the terrorist attacks,
we asked general managers for the following in-
formation. First, we asked the GMs whether they
are optimistic or pessimistic about the future of
their business. Second, we presented GMs with
a list of strategies and asked them which of these
actions they were taking to enhance revenues and
minimize operational costs.
We sent a questionnaire by fax to a stratified
random sample of U.S. general managers on
October 8 and 9, 2001.5 Of the 15,000
questionnaires that we distributed, 1,033 usable
surveys were returned. The hotels’ GMs
responded from every state in the United States
(see Exhibit 1) and were evenly representative of
old and new properties. The largest percentage
of respondents operated mid-market hotels or
motels, although small inns, extended-stay
properties, all-suite hotels, conference centers,
and convention hotels also were represented in
the sample. Most of the respondents operated
either mid-market hotels with food and beverage
(22.63 percent), properties without F&B (22.92
percent), or economy hotels (24.47 percent),
consistent with their supply in the overall U.S.
market. Exhibit 2 shows the distribution of the
sample by market segment.
The general managers’ responses were mixed,
and the severity of the effects of September 11
could not be generalized to all hotels in the
United States. While some GMs expressed a deep
concern for the decline in their market together
with pessimism regarding future business, others
remained relatively unaffected and optimistic.
Consequently, those who anticipated a business
downturn took corrective actions while others
continued with business as usual. The rest of this
article summarizes the various reactions and
insights that we collected from the GMs.
Economic Health
At the corporate level, mixed feelings prevail on
the prospect for economic recovery. Although the
4 “Smith Travel Research Announces Third Quarter 2001
U.S. Lodging-industry Results,” a press release from Smith
Travel Research, October 29, 2001.
EXHIBIT 1
Survey responses by location within the United States
5 The survey was stratified by market segment to ensure
that the hotels surveyed would be representative of the popu-
lation of hotels.
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majority of hotel executives and industry experts
agree that the industry’s economy was affected
dramatically by the terrorist attacks, those experts’
opinions vary regarding the timing of a full eco-
nomic recovery. Immediately after September 11,
some hotel-industry leaders were optimistic, such
as Hilton Hotel executives who believed that
business would pick up after a few months. Oth-
ers were pessimistic about the “pretty devastat-
ing” effect of the crisis.6
Industry executives disagreed regarding
whether the U.S. government would provide
subsidies to the hotel industry. Industry leaders
from Loews Hotel, Marriott International, Star-
wood Hotels and Resorts, and Carlson Com-
panies met with the U.S. Commerce Secretary
to request government support. Others, such as
Hilton Corporation and FelCor Lodging Trust,
questioned the necessity for government inter-
vention. Those leaders argued that the federal
government should limit financial support to the
most needy industries, such as the airlines.
Overall, the general consensus at the corporate
level on the economic outlook for the industry
appeared to be one of uncertainty, which
translated into a wait-and-see attitude.
Those executives’ feelings of uncertainty and
their strategy of wait and see was by no means
shared at the property level. The opinions
expressed by the hotel managers that we studied
reflected an attitude that government or other
external assistance was unlikely. More than 80
percent of the GMs in our study expressed their
fear that another terrorist attack on the United
States was possible in the near future. That fear
was coupled with pessimism that the U.S.
government would act to shore up the hospitality
industry. Only 23 percent of the general managers
surveyed indicated that they expected the federal
government to provide the necessary tax breaks
or other financial relief needed to turn around
the hospitality industry. In addition, one-third
of the GMs remained uncertain as to whether
the government would support the industry
at all. Overall, general managers were not hopeful
regarding the prospects of receiving govern-
mental aid and were uncertain about the political
stability of the country.
0 5 10 15 20 25
Extended stay    8.8%
Economy  24.5%
Mid-market without F&B 22.9%
Mid-market with F&B 22.6%
Upscale    11.6%
Luxury     9.6%
EXHIBIT 2
Survey responses by market segment
6 The Economist, pp. 61–62.
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Overall Industry vs. Local Markets
At the property level, general managers predicted
that the economy would be sluggish for at least a
full year after the attack. As shown in Exhibit 3,
general managers expected a mild to deep reces-
sion for the two quarters following the events (i.e.,
October 2001 through March 2002), after which
they anticipated economic stagnation for the sec-
ond quarter of 2002 (April, May, and June).
However, our respondents expected some growth
in the economy by the end of 2002 (that is, dur-
ing October, November, and December).
The general managers whom we surveyed
expressed a stronger concern for the well being
of the overall hotel industry than for the U.S.
economy in general. While about 15 percent
expected a deep recession for the U.S. economy
in the fourth quarter of 2001, almost twice as
many expected a deep recession for the hotel
industry. Interestingly, despite their pessimism
about the hotel industry in general, these GMs
remained optimistic about their local markets.
This suggests that many hotel operators were not
feeling the effects of the deteriorating market
environment at the time of this survey. In
particular, operators in secondary and tertiary
markets understood the effect that the terrorist
attacks might have on the national economy and
the hotel industry, but considered their local
markets to be less susceptible to significant
performance declines.
In summary, hotel general managers expected
an immediate negative economic effect from the
terrorist attacks at three different levels: the U.S.
economy, the hotel industry, and the local market.
Among those three possibilities, the effect was
expected to be strongest at the industry level
followed by the national-economy level. These
GMs remained relatively optimistic about local
markets. For the most part, pessimism gave way
to optimism in their expectations for the third
quarter of  2002 (July–September), approximately
a year after the initial attacks. However, that
optimism was tempered by the GMs’ reluctance
to predict rapid growth in any markets even
beyond 2003. As such, according to these GMs,
the economy, the overall industry, and local
markets are expected to show slow growth at best
in the near term (Exhibit 3).
Operational Performance
Our respondents noted the terrorist attacks’ nega-
tive effect on operations. More than a third of
general managers indicated that there was a drop
EXHIBIT 3
GMs’ perspective on and predictions for the U.S. and industry-related
economic conditions
     Rapid growth 5
     Slow growth 4
     Stagnation 3
     Mild recession 2
     Deep recession 1
Fourth Quarter First Quarter Second Quarter Third Quarter Fourth Quarter 2003
2001 2002 2002 2002 2002
 U.S. economy in general          Hospitality-industry in particular          Local economy only
2.19    2.33
1.98
2.50    2.63
2.35
3.13    3.14
2.96
3.55    3.57
3.40 3.39 3.66
3.54    3.45
3.80   3.70
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in ADR, and 42.7 percent said that they had expe-
rienced group cancellations due to the events of
September 11. Looking forward, more than half
responded that they expected a decline in occu-
pancy. Given that over 30 percent of the general
managers indicated that demand had been slow even
before the attacks (as confirmed by the STR data),7
the effect of the 9–11 events can be perceived as
contributing to an already difficult operating
environment.
Although most properties were already
experiencing declines in business prior to
September 11, GMs from the high-price
segments reported a greater decline in business
prior to 9–11 than did their colleagues at low-
price-segment hotels (see Exhibit 4). In other
words, business for all hotels was already falling
off before September 11, with upscale hotels
being more affected than mid- and low-scale
properties.
Exhibit 5 (on the next page) shows the percentage
of managers who expected occupancy in their
market to drop as a result of September 11’s events.
Consistent with their relative optimism prior to the
attacks, low-price-segment GMs (e.g., managers of
extended-stay hotels, economy hotels, and mid-
market hotels without F&B) reported less
pessimism regarding a drop in local market
occupancy. On the other hand, GMs of high-price
hotels such as luxury hotels, upscale hotels, and even
mid-market hotels with F&B reported that their
demand was slow even before the attacks and that
it had further deteriorated after the attacks. Three
out of four luxury- and upscale-hotel general
managers expected that their occupancy would
continue to drop after October 2001, but less than
half of the GMs at low-price-segment hotels
anticipated a sustained decline in occupancy.
Coping Strategies
In the wake of economic and political uncertainty
after September 11, general managers made im-
Luxury Upscale Mid-market Mid-market Economy Extended Stay
with F&B without F&B
EXHIBIT 4
Percentage of GMs (by price segment) who noted an economic slow
down before September 11
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
38% 38%
50%
23%
35%
23%
7 STR, December 2001, op. cit.
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portant strategic decisions to improve operational
performance by responding to evolving customer
needs and reducing fixed costs. Those “coping
strategies” ranged from modifications in market-
ing activities to reducing employees’ hours to
postponement of capital improvements. Exhibit
6 shows the degree to which general managers
used the coping strategies about which we
specifically asked them. The averages reported in
Exhibit 6 are based on a Likert-type scale rang-
ing from 1 = the strategy was not used at all to
5 = the strategy was used a great deal.
The GMs’ coping strategies can be categorized
as revenue enhancing or cost containing.
Revenue-enhancement strategies focus primarily
on marketing initiatives to raise occupancies,
whereas cost-containment strategies focus on
human-resources and property-management
activities to cut operating expenses. Of all the
available strategies, responding GMs relied most
on marketing options (e.g., focusing on regional
business and redirecting their sales efforts) and
human-resources savings (e.g., reducing workers’
hours).
The Key to Revenue Enhancement
Overall, general managers adopted or adapted
marketing strategies to deal with their particular
market environment. For instance, managers at
low-price-segment and airport hotels discounted
rates to attract customers. Meanwhile, GMs at
luxury hotels, conference-center hotels, conven-
tion centers, and resorts redirected their market-
ing efforts to focus on local business.
One month after September 11, 70 percent
of the general managers who responded to our
survey had discounted their room rates. Managers
at low-price-segment hotels were more likely than
their counterparts at high-price-segment hotels
to discount rates. Compared to 40 percent of the
mid-market and economy-hotel managers, less
than 30 percent of general managers at luxury or
upscale hotels had discounted their rates. Not
surprisingly, many managers at airport hotels
discounted their rates. Approximately half of the
airport managers who responded to our survey
indicated that they used a rate-cutting strategy
to offset declining business.
76%
61%
50%
77%
49%
46%
100%
90
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
Luxury Upscale Mid-market Mid-market Economy Extended Stay
with F&B without F&B
EXHIBIT 5
Percentage of GMs (by price segment) who expected to see
occupancy declines after 9–11
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Marketing makeover. About 70 percent of the
GMs from our survey indicated that they had
redirected their marketing efforts since September
11. Many of those GMs noted that the marketing
changes were made in an innovative manner at
little or no extra cost. Only 36 percent of those
who redirected their marketing efforts also
increased their marketing budget. Also, over 90
percent of the general managers indicated that
they had redirected their resources toward
regional business, with 73 percent revising
marketing plans to attract local residents for
weekend getaways. Our survey indicates that
managers at high-price-segment hotels and
conference–convention hotels actively relied on
close-to-home marketing efforts. With the
general decline in the number of travelers both
for business and pleasure, general managers of
high-end hotels were not able to maintain
business volumes by following their original
marketing plans. As such, the general tendency
was to creatively and flexibly adjust marketing
efforts to make up for lost revenue due to the
deteriorating economic environment.
Not at all Not much Somewhat Yes, often Yes, a lot
(1) (2) (3) (4)       (5)
Focus on regional business
Redirect sales and marketing efforts
Cut employees’ hours
Sell weekend nights to area residents
Discount room rates
Ask employees to use vacation time
Postpone renovations
Increase the marketing budget
Close guest rooms for renovations
Sell guest rooms for alternative uses
EXHIBIT 6
GMs’ use of selected coping strategies after 9–11
3.63
3.15
2.92
2.87
2.86
2.42
2.37
1.92
1.67
1.11
Exhibit 7 (overleaf ) reports the percentage
of general managers for each price segment who
redirected their sales and marketing efforts
(i.e., initiated new actions or strategies without
a formal plan) and those who formally revised
their marketing plans. The general managers
of high-price hotels modified their marketing
activities most dramatically to best use their
capacity. Approximately 60 percent of general
managers at upscale hotels and luxury hotels
redirected their sales and marketing efforts, and
more than 40 percent of them revised their
marketing plans. Conversely, managers at mid-
market hotels without F&B and GMs of
extended-stay hotels were not as active in
redirecting their marketing efforts or in
revising their marketing plans. That finding
may be partly explained by the popularity of a
price-discounting strategy used by managers of
low-price hotels. In other words, upscale hotel
managers relied on marketing strategies to
attract new customers while managers of low-
price-segment hotels focused on increasing
occupancy by offering rate discounts.
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100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
Convention and conference hotels stood out
as the leading hotel type whose managers relied
heavily on the strategy of redirecting marketing
efforts, as shown in Exhibit 8. However, given
the relatively low percentage of convention- and
conference-center managers who said that they
had revised their marketing plans (35 percent),
they might have reacted flexibly to the changing
economic environment without revisiting their
overall marketing plans. The same pattern can
be observed in all-suite hotels. Of the all-suite-
hotel general managers who responded to our
survey, 43 percent redirected their sales-and-
marketing activities but only 14 percent also
revised their marketing plans.
The most prevalent marketing strategy taken
by general managers was to focus on local
business. Indeed, this was the most popular of
all coping strategies identified in our survey. As
shown in Exhibit 9, this strategy was particularly
popular among luxury hotels and upscale hotels,
with over 75 percent of all responding general
managers indicating a heavy focus on local
business. Approximately half of the low-price-
segment hotel managers also reacted by trying to
attract local business. Resorts were by far the
most-aggressive locations in which hotel
managers focused on local business, with nearly
80 percent of the general managers pursuing this
coping strategy.
Likewise, conference- and convention-hotel
managers also started selling intensively within their
local markets (71 percent). This may be due to
the high levels of conference cancellations in the
weeks after the 9–11 events and customers’
reluctance to travel in the weeks after the attacks.
Having previously relied heavily on group business,
such properties had to deploy unconventional
strategies to fill their rooms and to support their
meeting and food and beverage facilities.
EXHIBIT 7
Percentage of GMs (by price segment) who adopted new
marketing strategies after 9–11
44%
38%36%
Luxury Upscale Mid-market Mid-market Economy Extended Stay
with F&B without F&B
56%
60%
44%42% 44%
38%
27%
33%
26%
Redirected sales and marketing efforts
Revised marketing plan
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100%
90%
80%
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EXHIBIT 8
Percentage of GMs (by hotel type) who adopted new
marketing strategies after 9–11
43%
65%
35%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
All-suites B&Bs and Conference– Extended- Others
small inns convention hotels stay hotels
14%
27%
40%
35%
21%
26%
30%
Redirected sales and marketing efforts
Revised marketing plan
76%
63%
55%
78%
42%
48%
Luxury Upscale Mid-market Mid-market Economy Extended Stay
with F&B without F&B
EXHIBIT 9
Percentage of GMs (by price segment) who focused on attracting local
business after 9-11
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS HOTELS’ RESPONSES TO 9–11
 16   Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly FEBRUARY 2002
Layoffs and Reduced Work Hours
Barry Sternlicht, Chairman and CEO of
Starwood Hotels and Resorts, stated: “Our fo-
cus in this crisis has been to react flexibly and
entrepreneurially and to run a lean, mean ma-
chine.”8 This quotation is representative of
GMs’ common strategy to contain costs. Faced
with an unfavorable business climate, our respon-
dents deemed it necessary to make difficult
choices. Some operators chose to freeze their cap-
ital expenditures by putting off projects and reno-
vation plans, while others temporarily reduced
their payroll costs by combining employees’
jobs and reducing workers’ hours. Reducing la-
bor expenses was the most popular approach.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
during the five weeks following the terrorist
attacks, more than 88,500 workers lost their jobs.
Those job losses were across industries and viewed
as either a direct or indirect result of the attacks.9
Indeed, among the workers that were reported
laid off, 43 percent were from the airline industry
and 36 percent from the hotel industry10
Moreover, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International estimated that more
than one-third of its members were laid off with
many more working reduced hours.11
During November 2001 Starwood Hotels
and Resorts formally stated that its intention was
to lay off approximately 10,000 employees. In
contrast, Hilton Hotels and Marriott Inter-
national were among those companies that
refrained from making public their intentions
to reduce staffing levels. Hilton Hotels ac-
EXHIBIT 10
Percentage of GMs (by price segment) who laid off employees after 9–11
60%
33%34%
100%
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Luxury Upscale Mid-market Mid-market Economy Extended Stay
with F&B without F&B
68%
49% 38%
8 As quoted in: Michael Billig, “Industry Develops Strate-
gies to Offset Downturn After Terrorist Attacks,” Hotel
Business, Vol. 19, No. 20 (October 21–November 6, 2001),
p. 9.
9 “Impact of the Events of September 11, 2001, on the Mass
Layoff Statistics Data Series,” from a monthly news release
issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, November 30,
2001.
10 Ibid.
11 From a press release issued by: Hotel Employees and Res-
taurant Employees International, December 10, 2001.
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knowledged that the company was “experiencing
the worst times ever experienced,” and that the
plan was for employees to “reduce their work
hours.” Similarly, it was reported that employees
at Marriott International were working reduced
hours, but decisions for layoffs were left to the
general managers.12
We found that the human-resources strategies
of cutting workers’ hours, asking employees to
use vacation time (or take time off without pay),
and instituting layoffs were widely applied after
September 11. The extent to which those tactics
were employed was not as high as we expected to
find, however. In addition, the choice of strategies
and the extent of their application differed among
hotels. For instance, the strategy to lay off em-
ployees was actively pursued mostly by man-
agers of upper-tier hotels, resort hotels, and
convention–conference hotels. Likewise, the
strategy to reduce employee work hours was used
more by managers of upscale and conference–
convention hotels as compared to the strategies
employed by managers from midscale and
economy properties. That is, low-price hotels
appeared not to be actively using any of the
human-resources strategies to a substantial de-
gree relative to their upscale counterparts.
Overall, seven out of ten managers who
responded to our survey used some form of
workforce-reduction strategy to cope with their
particular situations. Specifically, 55 percent laid
off employees, 61 percent scheduled employees
to work fewer hours, and 43 percent asked
employees to use their vacation time or go on
furlough. In fact, 35 percent of those managers
deployed simultaneously all three of those
human-resources strategies. Among those hotel
managers who did not lay off employees, about
half asked their employees to work reduced hours
and one-third asked employees to take vacations.
Regarding layoffs, we found that the extent
of employee displacement was generally less
serious than expected and less than that portrayed
by the media.13 In our survey, the number of
EXHIBIT 11
Percentage (average) of employees laid off after 9–11
(by price segment)
7%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0
Luxury Upscale Mid-market Mid-market Economy Extended
with F&B without F&B Stay
12%
9%
8%
7%
12%
12 “Hotel Companies Face New Labor Issue as Slowdown
Forces Major Staffing Cutbacks,” Hotel Business, Vol. 10,
No. 20 (October 21–November 6, 2001), pp. 1, 20.
13 See: Ibid.; and Marilyn Adams, “Cities Suffer as Travelers
Stay Home,” USA Today, October 3, 2001, p. 3.
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workers laid off as a percentage of a hotel’s total
workforce was, on average, 9 percent. Not
surprisingly, that percentage differed by the type
of hotel that the managers operated. For instance,
as already mentioned, managers at luxury and
mid-market hotels with food and beverage
facilities laid off larger proportions of their labor
force (12 percent on average) than did hotels
in other categories. Exhibit 11 shows the
percentage of the hotel workforce laid off in
various segments.
Relative to their luxury-segment counterparts,
managers at low-price-segment hotels overall were
less likely to lay off employees. However, among
those that did lay off workers, their work-force
cuts were quite deep—20 to 24 percent on
average. That high percentage suggests to us that
there were some economy and budget-hotel
operators who seized the opportunity to dismiss
large numbers of employees for reasons that were
not all related to September 11’s events.
Exhibit 12 shows the degree to which various
hotel types reduced employees’ work hours. As
noted earlier, the data show that the strategy of
reducing employees’ work hours was used most
by general managers of upscale hotels (68 percent,
versus only 28 percent for some other types of
GMs). We find it likely that that strategy was
well underway prior to September 11.
Exhibit 13 shows that hotel managers in resort
locations laid off more employees (59 percent)
than did managers in any other location.
Managers at airport and suburban hotels were
not as likely as resort managers to lay off
employees, but they still reduced their staffing
levels. General managers at 46 percent of the
airport hotels and 41 percent of the suburban
hotels dismissed about 11 percent of the total
workforce in those types of hotels. The general
managers at those hotels also relied on other
human-resources strategies, such as reducing
work hours (almost 50 percent) and encouraging
vacations (more than 25 percent).
General managers of highway hotels were the
least likely to lay off employees, with only 30
percent of our respondents using this strategy
(and displacing on average just 5 percent of their
workforce). Strategies to reduce work hours and
to encourage vacations were not employed much
by these hotel managers, possibly because they
simply did not feel the effects of a declining
market environment.
Sixty-four percent of the convention–
conference hotel managers laid off employees,
however, the proportion of their employees laid
off was relatively small, with an average of 7
percent. Also, the strategy to reduce work hours
was popular among the convention–conference
hotel managers (approximately 60 percent). This
may suggest that managers at convention–
conference hotels simultaneously laid off full-time
employees and reduced the work hours of the
remaining employees. All-suite hotel managers
were also likely to lay off employees (56 percent),
although on average those workforces were
reduced by only 4 percent. All in all, general
managers indicated that the extent to which they
reduced their total workforce was relatively small
compared to what one might have expected.
EXHIBIT 12
Percentage of GMs (by price segment) who reduced
workers’ hours after 9-11
28%
Luxury Upscale Mid-market Mid-market Economy Extended
with F&B without F&B Stay
64%
28%
68%
45%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
47%
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Property-management Savings:
Not Much
Other cost-containment strategies focused on
property-management practices. Corporate man-
agers reported that some hotels were closing
guest-room floors, postponing renovations, and
canceling major projects. In response to those re-
ports, PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated that
6 percent of the hotel projects slated for a 2002
or 2003 completion would either be delayed or
cancelled.14 We asked our group of general man-
agers what they were doing differently in man-
aging their properties.
The GMs in our study did not report any
strong initiatives in property management. Fewer
than 10 percent of the hotel managers surveyed
were closing rooms for renovation, and a quarter
of the managers were delaying renovation plans.
Despite the overall dearth of property-
management strategies to cut costs, there were
some differences in the initiatives used by various
hotel-manager types. For instance, as explained
below, managers at the high-price-segment hotels
in general took more initiatives in property
management after the September 11 events than
did their low-price-segment counterparts.
Although the strategy to close unused rooms
to speed up a renovation schedule was not
frequently used, managers at luxury hotels used
this tactic more often than did GMs at low-price-
segment hotels. Sixteen percent of the GMs at
luxury hotels surveyed closed rooms for
renovation, compared to 4 percent of economy-
hotel managers. Similar to luxury-hotel managers,
some managers at mid-market hotels with food
and beverage used the strategy of taking
advantage of low occupancy to accelerate room
renovations. Also, the strategy to close unused
rooms for renovation was relatively popular
among managers of resort hotels (14 percent) and
B&Bs and small inns (18 percent).
On the other hand, compared to the luxury-
hotel general managers who accelerated their
renovations, even more GMs at upscale hotels
and mid-market hotels with food and beverage
put off their scheduled renovation plans (perhaps
because they felt the pinch of the shortage of
funds due to a drop in business). Among upscale
hotels, 33 percent postponed their renovation
projects while 32 percent of mid-market hotels
postponed such projects. Also, the strategy to
delay renovations was popular among about a
third of the managers of urban hotels, suburban
hotels, and airport hotels.
Conclusion
We have attempted to summarize the collective
strategies of property-level general managers who
are dealing on a daily basis with the effects of the
September 11 terrorist attacks. We discovered
that the economic effect was definitely felt at the
unit level and that managers quickly had to make
strategic adjustments to cope with their indi-
vidual situations.
EXHIBIT 13
Percentage of GMs (by price segment) who laid off
employees after 9–11
30%
Urban Suburban Airport Highway Resort
42%
59%
41%
46%
100%
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
14 “Hotel Delays Projects, Cuts Costs to Fight Slowdown,”
Hotel Business, Vol. 10, No. 20 (October 21–November 6,
2001), pp. 1, 9.
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In presenting our data and observations, we
are by no means capturing the complete picture
of what is now happening in the field. However,
our hope is that this information regarding what
did happen gives general managers an
opportunity to compare their reactions to
September 11 with those of other managers in
their market segment and hotel type.
Innovations often happen during difficult
times. It is during times of turmoil that managers
use their resources wisely to accommodate
evolving customer needs and to contain expenses.
For example, we know of  hotels in New York
City that converted their rooms to accommodate
rescue workers and to provide office space for
displaced workers. Elsewhere, general managers
adjusted their marketing plans to capture business
from the local market (to replace that lost by the
slowdown of business and leisure travel). Beyond
the immediate despair of the events of September
11, we note the inherent strength and resiliency
of hotel operators.  
